We have a moral and ethical obligation to those we put in harm's way, to clearly articulate personnel recovery policy, doctrine, and plans, and put the resources in place so that we can recover our isolated personnel safely and expeditiously. 
VADM Martin Mayer, DCINC, US Joint Forces Command

CSAR Problem and Thesis
Does the current organization provide the JTF with the most effective tools to accomplish the CSAR mission for all the services in wartime? During the past 50 years, tremendous improvements in CSAR capabilities have taken place. However, in the 1990's the capabilities have suffered due to higher priorities within the military services. 3 This has been evident during more recent operations in Southwest Asia, Bosnia, Serbia, and Afghanistan, where there have been repeated CSAR deficiencies in providing an effective force for personnel recovery of isolated personnel. 4 The JFC has compensated for CSAR shortcomings by tasking special operations forces (SOF) as the primary CSAR force. SOF offers unique conventional and unconventional capabilities in the low, medium, and high threat environment. Even though SOF normally brings an "ad hoc" organization, it provides a "911 panic button" and "one stop shopping" capability for multifaceted missions. These SOF capabilities have resulted in numerous successful rescues and, therefore, have made SOF the JFC force of choice for CSAR. However, since CSAR is a collateral mission and not a core mission for SOF, tasking SOF as the primary CSAR provider for the JTF could potentially deter SOF from their primary missions and dangerously limit the JFC response to special operations missions. This paper will address joint CSAR deficiencies and propose a solution to improve the commander in chief's (CINC's) CSAR capabilities. Specifically, it will propose the development of a Joint CSAR Task Force (JCSARTF) to integrate the military services' CSAR capabilities underneath the CINC's Special Operations Command (SOC) component commander in peacetime-a step that will streamline the JFC's capability for wartime. 5 In addition, to sustain this JCSARTF concept, the consolidation of the Air Force's CSAR forces and the Air Force's Special Operation Force's (AFSOF) CSAR capabilities underneath SOCOM can improve the unity of command and effort for the JFC's CSAR mission. 6 To support this thesis, the paper will examine current joint doctrine and each military service's CSAR capabilities. Moreover, it will analyze CSAR lessons learned from recent contingencies and offer recommendations to reduce the CSAR redundancy within the services and enhance the JFC CSAR capability in wartime. During Vietnam, although the Air Force's ARRS was considered the primary CSAR provider, the Navy provided primary coverage for the Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea while the Army provided additional capability overland. 8 Also, each service still had to provide CSAR for its own forces and during almost any circumstance, any of the services would have to respond to "hot" isolated personnel situations depending on local availability.
CSAR Background
For example, during the recovery efforts of Bat 21 (Lt Col Iceal "Gene" Hambleton) in
Vietnam, several CSAR assets and support forces were diverted for the CSAR mission.
Although this CSAR mission has been lauded by some as "the greatest combat search and rescue effort ever undertaken," 9 it cost 11 U.S. servicemen's lives and several aircraft. Some might argue the military should not take this type of lofty risk. However, the U.S. has shown historically it resolves to take risks to prevent isolated personnel from getting into enemy hands and being used as leverage tools or human shields. This directive established the DOD policy for personnel recovery and states that:
Preserving the lives and well-being of US military, DOD civilian and contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one the highest priorities of the DOD. The DOD has a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being used as leverage against the U.S.
This directive set the foundation for Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint CSAR, which dictates the authoritative guidance to conduct CSAR for all services and SOCOM. In addition, this CSAR publication "incorporates joint and service doctrine into a single-source publication and provides the guidance and procedures necessary to plan, coordinate, and conduct a timely and tailored joint combat CSAR response across the range of military operations." 16 Joint CSAR Doctrine represents an honest effort to address pre-Gulf War CSAR issues, but it does not fully synthesize the services' and SOCOM's capabilities into a sound organization to provide for unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. CSAR activities, including coordination with the JSRC and other components RCCs. 18 As depicted in Figure 1 , the JFC will normally exercise C² of all forces committed to the CSAR mission through a designated component commander using its RCC as the JSRC. 
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RCC (4, 5) RCC (4, 5) RCC (4, 5) UNITS (7) JOC (4, 5, 6) UNITS ( watercraft units could be assigned CSAR missions, but they should only be used in a semipermissive or nonpermissive operational environment with adequate protection. 22 The organic capability within the Army is a viable CSAR option during certain circumstances for JFC. However, due to insufficient CSAR training and quantities of rescue platforms such as HH-60, CH-47, and UH-1 aircraft, the Army is not considered a primary CSAR force provider for the JFC.
The Navy considers CSAR a primary mission, but more than half of its dedicated CSAR capabilities remain in the Naval Reserves, within its helicopter combat support squadrons (HCS). 23 The remaining CSAR assets are within the organic carrier battle group (CVBG) CSAR capability, which consist of selected units from the Navy's helicopter antisubmarine warfare squadrons (HS). These units are highly trained to conduct day and night CSAR and naval special warfare (NSW) operations in a hostile environment. 24 
Lessons Learned
During recent conflicts the JFC has looked into his "CSAR toolbox" and has noticed that many CSAR capabilities or tools are scattered throughout the services and are not organized into an "off the shelf" joint force multiplier. This was displayed during the Gulf War when the primary JFC's CSAR forces, such as the Air Rescue Service (ARS), were in a transition phase with retiring its HH-3 helicopters and did not have sufficient numbers of HH-60s to conduct the CSAR mission. The ARS and other services did not have the force structure to recover the estimated 40 aircraft per day losses for the initial operations of the Gulf War. 35 Therefore, the JFC relied mainly on AFSOF's and Army SOF's capability to fulfill the overland CSAR operations, while the Navy's HS units provided coverage beyond 12 miles in the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea. 36 AFSOF and Army SOF were tasked to conduct CSAR late in the preparation and planning of the Gulf War. This, coupled with CSAR being a collateral mission, did not provide the JFC with a well-trained and equipped force for theater CSAR prior to the Gulf War. The C² was set up with the JFACC using a joint RCC (predecessor to the JSRC) 37 which was severely undermanned and caused numerous C² problems for the JFSOCC CSAR planning and execution. For example, one CSAR C² incident caused a 72 hour delay to launch one rescue. 38 The experience reveals the consequences of the lack of an overall CSAR commander, dedicated forces, and available CSAR C² capability. Unfortunately, the short duration of the war and relatively low shootdown rate did not generate an urgent need to overcome the problems.
Following the Gulf War, the Air Force's ARS took the place of SOF and was able to deploy rescue forces to Kuwait to provide CSAR for Operation Southern Watch. However, when the U.S. military became involved with combat operations in former Yugoslavia, the ARS and other services did not have enough CSAR forces to support both theaters. Corps provided some relief for AFSOF, but the services were unable to establish a capable CSAR force to relieve AFSOF permanently through Operation Allied Force. 40 Once again, during combat operations over Serbia and Kosovo, AFSOF provided the CSAR core to the JFC. There were only two aircraft lost to enemy fire and both pilots were recovered successfully. During the F-117-Vega 31 CSAR mission, the priority to recover the pilot was at the highest level due to his sensitive mission. Although the recovery of Vega 31 was successful, lessons learned from Operation Allied Force revealed the following crucial weaknesses that have not improved since the Gulf War:
Ø Dedicated CSAR forces to support CINC requirements must be designated, fully trained and available, preferably in theater.
Ø In lieu of dedicated in-theater forces, a "quick turn," deployable "911" rapid response rescue force, able to operate in the AOR within 72 hours of notification could provide the CINC CSAR forces. 41 
CSAR Today
In 1999, based on the 1990's lessons learned, the DOD and its military leaders determined that CSAR was "broken" in the services and did not support the JFC. forces within a JSOTF concept, "ready to deploy on short notice to any regional conflict." 43 According to JPRA, the CSAR organization in Afghanistan is classified, however, "it is safe to say AFSOF and Army SOF JSOTFs were the only forces available to provide the JFC with a capable CSAR force after September 11 th ." A logical precursor to these recommendations would be to change SOCOM's CSAR mission to a primary mission. As previously discussed, theater SOCs have been accomplishing CSAR as a primary mission, but SOCOM can only train, equip, and organize SOF to conduct CSAR as a collateral mission. Changing SOCOM's CSAR mission to a primary mission will enhance its priority within SOCOM and start the reorganization of CSAR within the theater SOC's. Also, this recommendation would boost the theater SOC's focus on the CSAR mission and increase its priority within its Mission Essential Task Lists. 46 Furthermore, it would promote the integration of CSAR tactics, techniques, and procedures within SOF planning and joint mission employment. Primary mission status would eliminate any questions on the importance of CSAR and give SOF a sense of ownership for the CSAR mission. This change in mission tasking should result in a seamless transition and offer a good starting point to implement the JCSARTF concept within the theater SOCs.
JCSARTF Concept Underneath Theater CINCs/SOCs
A functional JCSARTF established in peacetime underneath the theater's SOC can provide the CINC's with capable CSAR forces ready for wartime. Within the CINC's force architecture, the JCSARTF structure can be designed similar to a JSOTF organization by designating representatives from the theater SOC, subordinate units, and other CSAR component C² capabilities. 47 For example, the Air Force maintains deployable JSRC C² packages and trained rescue coordinators that are readily available for CSAR operations.
These capabilities were designed to provide the JSRC with a standing interoperable C² capability for the services. This existing capability can be integrated with SOF's Joint
Operations Center (JOC) C² capability in order to give the theater SOC robust CSAR C².
These capabilities would create a joint C² core to assist the theater SOC's designated units within their operational CSAR mission.
To ensure an effective CSAR capability, the theater SOC must select units based on the capability to support a CINC's planned contingency operations. Once established, the theater SOC and subordinate unit commanders need to manage the dedicated CSAR force and verify that the units assets are not multi-tasked with SOF missions. Lessons learned from Operation Allied Force indicated that sufficient numbers of forces were allocated to support special operations prior to the conflict. However, once the JSOTF in Italy was tasked with the CSAR mission, the SOF alert forces were, on occasion, allocated to multiple missions which could have created a detrimental situation for both missions. 48 If allocation problems exist, the theater SOC can request staff and unit augmentation from the CINC's staff or through SOCOM's chain of command as described in SOF doctrine. 49 Dedicated CSAR forces and a C² staff are key to implementing the JCSARTF concept ready for wartime. As in Figure 2 , the proposed CSAR command relationships will flow directly to the JFSOCC. program. 51 The JCET program can offer the JFC an opportunity to exercise the JCSARTF concept and identify CSAR limiting factors (LIMFACs), which should improve the interoperability within U.S. and foreign services.
One might argue that the theater SOC cannot supply sufficient forces to a JCSARTF concept, which would limit the SOC's ability to conduct SOF and CSAR missions simultaneously. However, consolidation of Air Force CSAR forces and AFSOF can create a versatile capability that will alleviate this concern.
Consolidate Air Force CSAR Forces and AFSOF
The Air Force's CSAR forces and AFSOF have similar principal and collateral missions. In examining both mission lists, one can see the redundancy not only in the area of CSAR but also in seven other missions. 52 For example, both organizations are tasked to support noncombatant evacuations (NEO) missions for the theater CINCs. Based on this premise and the redundancy of CSAR capability within the Air Force, both organizations should be reorganized underneath one command to achieve unity of command and unity of effort for the CSAR mission.
As discussed previously, since SOCOM has been the lead on providing CSAR to the theater CINCs, the reorganization should be established underneath SOCOM's primary CSAR provider-AFSOC. 53 This would launch a single advocate for CSAR and provide unity of command and effort for the CSAR mission. In addition, the reorganizing of Air Force CSAR will offer the following advantages to the theater CINCs: Additional disadvantages should be identified during JFCOM's SAR exercises (SAREX) and managed through JPRA. 55 JFCOM is the DOD's joint force integrator and is responsible to improve personnel recovery capabilities throughout the services. JPRA is the "eyes and ears" for personnel recovery and can identify future LIMFACs once the consolidation of Air Force CSAR and AFSOF is accomplished.
The services and SOCOM have been squeezing their budgets to fund priorities. In addition, there are no indications that new equipment or units are being funding for dedicated CSAR capabilities. Therefore, the consolidation of CSAR forces in SOCOM will create efficiencies that will compensate for CSAR shortages and provide a dedicated force for both CSAR and SOF missions in all threat environments. This recommendation would complement the JCSARTF force structure by providing the theater CINCs with a dedicated CSAR capability for future conflicts.
V CONCLUSION
Throughout history, the U.S. military has inefficiently supported its armed forces with dedicated CSAR capabilities in either peacetime or wartime. During past major operations since the Gulf War, the services' joint CSAR capabilities have not been merged to form an effective dedicated CSAR "package" for the JTF. All services do provide an organic CSAR capability, but based on their inadequate assets and mission priorities, they have not been the JFC's first choice for the CSAR mission. To compensate, SOF have provided the JTF with a capable CSAR force during hostilities even though they are not organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CSAR as a primary mission. The JFC's CSAR mission capability has been surviving, but can be enhanced by placing one commander in charge during peacetime and wartime to ensure unity of command and unity of effort. As Professor Milan Vego states, "at the operational level and higher, success is difficult to achieve without having unity of effort through unity of command." These recommendations would provide the warfighting CINCs with continuous dedicated CSAR forces. However, CSAR is a joint issue and will require the backing of all services to ensure a credible CSAR capability is provided for the combatant CINCs. The U.S. military has been fortunate in recent operations by having few POWs and isolated personnel situations. The recommendations in this paper will help ensure that this record will continue into the future.
